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*Family structure effects over children  
educational level and status attainment in Spain*

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# **FAMILY STRUCTURE EFFECTS OVER CHILDREN EDUCATIONAL LEVEL AND STATUS ATTAINMENT IN SPAIN<sup>37</sup>**

## **(ROUGH DRAFT)**

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In this paper is presented a little introduction to spanish situation about education, market labour, unions and fertility, housework, religion and family policies. After that, it is presented results about the effects of divorce (or separation) and widowhood over educational (the status attainment is now resarch in progress). This work is intended to be a replication of Biblarz and Gottainer (2000) to the extent that our data permit.

### **ABOUT SPAIN**

In order to reach an adequate understanding of the phenomena concerning the types partnership in Spain, we must consider the question in some historical perspective. We must take into account the facts of the Civil War (1936-1939), Francisco Franco dictatorship, with two periods: the post-war period (1939-1959), the period governed under the so called Modernization and Development Plans (1959-1977), and after the Franco's died (in 1975), the democratic period (1977 onwards). After the Civil War, it took a long time to recover from the severe fall in the level of economic development, which did not begin to recover until the late fifties. During the sixties, Spain turned from an agrarian economy to an industrial and services oriented one. The ideological framework of the dictatorial regime, today known as 'National-Catholicism', which was a mixture of elements of fascist and corporatist ideology with catholic fundamentalism, ensured a considerable institutional weight to the Catholic Church. As a result, during Franco's regime, the only conceivable legal divorce was proper annulment of marriage by the Church authorities (a costly and difficult process). At the same time, *de facto* separation was socially condemned. After the advent of democracy, a Divorce Law was passed in 1981. Church's influence (Alberdi 1999) turned this law into a 'moderately' restrictive one, as measured in how difficult for unwilling partners is to obtain legal divorce. This law requires a period of legally sanctioned separation before any of the partners may apply for divorce. The difference between legal separation and divorce is limited to the partners' right to remarry. Given that applying for divorce, after separation, entails starting a second judiciary process, not every separated couple ends up divorcing.

I think that the low level of divorce rates in Spain (Alberdi, 1999; see table 4 in apendix) may be explained according to what (Esping-Andersen, 1999) calls 'familialistic' welfare regimes. Those are the regimes which allocate a great welfare burden on the shoulders of the traditional family. Obvious examples are Italy and Spain. In these countries, the vast majority of the population are catholic. This fact has led some authors to overstress the importance of catholic

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<sup>37</sup> Earlier versions of this the papers have been presented at the International Comparative Workshop on *Assortative Partnership Decisions, Division of Work in the Household and Unions Separation*, Bremen University, Germany, December 10-11, 1999, in *European Network about Divorce*, European Institute of Florence, November 2002, and in a seminar in Center of Demography and Ecology of Wisconsin University in Madison . Special thanks to J. Dronkers, E. Thompson and C. Milesi.

moral norms to explain the low rate of divorce. This argument is questionable if we just take into account the increasing levels of secularization of Spanish society from the sixties on. Besides, this kind of argument could not explain why, for instance, catholic moral norms are largely ignored with regard to other family issues, notably fertility. However, an explanation based in the institutional structure of 'familialistic' welfare regimes may account of both phenomena. For one, the welfare regime hinders women's participation in the labour market. For two, the very existence of non traditional households is made "institutionally" difficult in many ways (starting by such apparently trivial things as the tight regulation on the hours at which shops may be open). It is more reasonable to suppose that the influence of Catholic religion takes place at the macro level: on the one hand, in the historical genesis of this kind of societies, on the other, in recent times, the Catholic Church, as an institution, tried to block or, at least, slow down, the enactment of family related legislation (such as divorce), or to restrict its contents.

Another factor which merits attention is the social cost, in terms of severed relationships with relatives and friends, which may involve getting divorced in Spain. This cost may explain low levels of divorce or cohabitation, but this cost is reduced as the number of people that divorce, or live together without marrying, increases.

## Education

In Spain there have been two major reforms of the educational system that have affected the population under study. One in 1953 and the other in 1973. Both established two educational trajectories, one academic and the other, vocational. The main difference between the two is found in secondary education. The 1953 reform established several types of secondary education, some of which led to occupations such as schoolteacher, accountant or junior engineers and gave access to certain university degrees which, according to the functional criteria of the project *Comparative Analysis of Social Mobility in Industrial Nations* (CASMIN classification), were equivalent to level 3.1 (first three years of university). Besides this, there were the strictly academic and strictly vocational trajectories. The 1973 reform left only vocational and academic secondary education, it being possible, but not usual, to go from higher vocational secondary education to a limited number of higher studies. For the purposes of this research, the most relevant fact is that the new educational system established compulsory schooling until the age of fourteen, thus making primary education completely universal.<sup>38</sup>

The average educational level of Spaniards increased drastically throughout the twentieth century, but even now it is lower than the average level of the citizens of the OECD countries as a whole: in 1996, 60% of the inhabitants between the ages of 25 and 65 in the OECD countries had an educational level of at least higher secondary education, but in Spain the percentage dropped to half of this. The differences in the cohort between 25 and 34 were less, but still considerable (72% for OECD countries, 50% for Spain). However, if one takes into account the proportion of university graduates, Spain on average equals the OECD in 13%, and for those under 44 is even above average. This disproportion between university graduates and those with a secondary school education may be due to the fact that the vocational trajectory in secondary education has not had much prestige and an academic education is not valued in itself but merely as a means of gaining access to the university, both by families and employers.

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<sup>38</sup> The 1973 system is currently being replaced by a new comprehensive system, compulsory until the age of 16. But since this population falls outside our study, it is not taken into account.

The same as in other industrialised countries, differences according to sex were also considerable in the older generations, but in the younger generations women surpass men in schooling (at least, in the 25-34 yr. old age group, 48% of the men reached secondary education and 52% of the women).

## **Labour Market**

During Franco's dictatorship, by law, a woman's decision to work was subject to the will of the head of the family on which she legally depended (her father, until marriage, and then her husband). With Democracy, the labour rights of men and women were made equal, and the real situation improved, although in fact equality was not reached.

The percentage of women working has increased drastically, going from 34.8% in 1973 to 42.6% in 1991; this increase is much greater if we only take into account women between the ages of 25 and 54, where the figures have risen from 27.9% to 48.6% (Bover 1997, with data from the OCDE Labour Force Statistics). The unemployment rate for women has remained almost double that of men from 1986 until now. As regards differences in salary, after controlling for experience and educational level, they are estimated at between 20% and 30%. This lack of equality is considered to be due to a purely discriminatory effect in some 2/3 (Alba 2000). It should be pointed out that if salaries are measured according to educational level, they are greater for women than for men, with the differences practically disappearing among university graduates (Moreno, Rodríguez and Vera 1996: 113), which could explain the fact that in the younger generations the educational level of women is higher.

Occupational segregation according to sex has increased in recent years, both when we consider the most recent cross-sectional data (Alba 2000) and when we consider, with retrospective questions (in 1991), the first occupations according to birth cohorts or occupations after reaching a certain age (Salido 2001). After controlling for the greater participation of women in the labour market and the changes in the occupational structure, the aggregated indexes of occupational segregation of Duncan and Karmel-MacLachlan increase, but "the relative position of women has undergone a considerable improvement both in absolute terms, i.e. with respect to previous cohorts of women, and in relative terms, i.e. in comparison with men" (Salido 2001: ). This is due to the fact that in the 1960s and 1970s women's educational level was lower and their work career was subordinated to family life, and they occupied the worst jobs (Salido, 2001). This occupational improvement is mainly a consequence of a decrease in unskilled labour and jobs in the industrial sector and an increase in intellectual jobs or people-related jobs, such as social services (Garrido 1992).

As regards working hours, the same as in Greece and Italy, the low availability of part-time work is notable. Between 1985 and 1995 the rate of part-time workers among women between 15 and 64 yrs. of age rose from 3.5% to 5.3% (Fina 1998, with Eurostat Labour Force Survey Data) partly due to the fact that the public sector does not offer many part-time jobs (Fina 1996). Part-time women workers are usually unskilled and have small children (Cebrián, Moreno and Toharia 1996); hence Fina (1996) notes that their intention seems to be to join the labour force when their responsibilities with their children decrease. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that most women who work part-time would prefer a full-time job, according to the Labour Force Survey (EPA).

## **Unions and Fertility**

The average age of first marriages was 26 for women and 30 for men until the mid 1950s, after which this age decreased to reach a minimum in 1981 of just over 26 for men and a little under 24 for women (Cabr  1994:121, with data from the Natural Movement of the Spanish Population, of the INE). From then on, the age of marriage has steadily and mildly increased. The number of marriages has decreased, the period total first marriage rates dropping from 1,024 per 1,000 in 1975 (a paradoxical result due to the use of an approximation period) to 640 in 1985 (Delgado and Livi-Bacci 1992) but this is not compensated by an increase in cohabitation as occurs in other countries (Delgado 1996).

As regards fertility, in Spain the same as in Italy there was a decrease in the fertility rate in the 1970s, later than in other countries in western Europe. In Spain the TFR went from 2.78 in 1975 to 1.39 in 1990 (Delgado and Livi-Bacci 1992), 1.25 in 1995 and 1.07 in 1999. These authors set up some hypotheses to explain this low TFR in both countries, which they attribute to later marriage, fewer marriages, the longer stay of children in the parental home (this can be seen in detail in Jurado 1997) due to the high rate of unemployment among young people and the long years of study, as well as the high price of housing in relation to salaries.

## **Housework**

As in other countries, on an average men spend less time on housework (three quarters of an hour a day) than women (five and a half hours a day). In the case of women who work outside the home, the average time per day spent on housework is three hours and thirty-five minutes. If we compare them by level of studies, the differences between the sexes are considerably less, since it is more likely that, with higher qualifications, women will work outside the home and, moreover, men who are university graduates spend more time on domestic chores (approximately a quarter of an hour more). In general, Spanish women have about two hours less free time than men, after housework, work outside the home and essential necessities (on which both sexes spend almost the same time).<sup>39</sup> Although the time spent by women on housework may decrease as their social position improves and their partner tends to spend a little more time on it in relative terms, the final responsibility for domestic activities (what food to buy, supervising the household help..) still rests with the woman (Guti rrez 2002).

## **Religion<sup>40</sup>**

Spain has been principally a Roman Catholic country throughout modern and contemporary history since at the end of the 15th century and the beginning of the 16th, the Jews and Muslims that did not convert to Catholicism were expelled. The major historical confrontations in recent times due to religion have not been between religions, but between non-religious (agnostics and atheists) and Catholics as occurred during the Spanish Civil War. Currently, 90% of Spaniards consider themselves Catholics, 8% non-believers, and the rest belong to other religions. Despite this great current weight of the Catholic religion, it must be pointed out that between 1970 and

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<sup>39</sup> All these data are from Ramos (1990), based on study 1709 of the Centro de Investigaciones Sociol gicas (Sociological Research Centre).

<sup>40</sup> The data in this section come from a preliminary use of CIRES study no. 12 carried out in November, 1991 with a sample of 1200 Spaniards over 18.

1989 the proportion of those who considered themselves practising Catholics fell from 87% to 53%, while the percentage of non-believers and indifferent increased from 2% to 26% over the same period (González and González-Anleo 1992). Sixty-five percent of the Catholics consider themselves in favour of or indifferent to divorce, as opposed to 97% of the non-Catholics. Among Catholics, 18% are against women with children working outside the home as opposed to 11% of the non-Catholics.

Obviously, Catholics are more in favour than non-Catholics of the opinions of the Pope and the church on family matters, but there is, however, a high degree of disagreement between believers and the Church. Among those who declare themselves Catholics, 57% refuse to let the Church have a say in family problems, 72% say they are against the Pope's rejection of divorce and 76% are against the Pope's ban on contraceptives. The greatest difference between Catholics and non-believers lies precisely in the type of union of the couple that they are more in agreement with, since 77% of the Catholics would choose to marry in church if they had to marry again and only 8.7% would choose co-habitation, whereas among the non-believers, 27% would choose a civil marriage and 46%, co-habitation.<sup>41</sup> Therefore, it seems that the influence of religious beliefs is greater concerning the type of union than as regards other family matters. In Spain, then, it seems that religion could more easily explain the low rate of co-habitation than the low rate of divorce.

## Family Policies

In Spain, policies in support of the family have been and continue to be minimal. During the Franco dictatorship, the regime extolled the patriarchal, Catholic family as the cornerstone of society, supporting it with criminal laws and civil discrimination. Prizes were given for child-bearing and pensions awarded to widows and orphans, but this aid was never enough to compensate the situation at home and their amount was not kept up with inflation (Meil 1995; Iglesias 1998). With the arrival of democracy, anything bearing the name "family" was considered to be related to the dictatorial regime, to the extent that family policies were considered contrary to women's emancipation, "and therefore there is nothing to be said about family policies, and policies protecting the family as a social group disappeared" in the 1980s (Iglesias 1998: 229; and similar arguments in Alba 2000). The 1990s brought improvements in maternity leave, aid to families caring for elderly family members and the concept of a "large family" was broadened, but Spain is still among the countries that allocate the lowest amounts to family benefits, with a per capita expenditure as a percentage of the GDP of 1% as opposed to the 8.1% average of the European Union (CES 1997). The present conservative government has started to implement some family aid measures in the tax area, which it hopes to soon accompany with more policies in support of the family. At present, both the number of places in public residences for the elderly (Pérez-Díaz, Chuliá and Álvarez Miranda 1998) and the number of school places for the under-three year olds (Alba 2000) is still far below the European average, hence these care-taking responsibilities are still hindering women's integration into the labour market.

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<sup>41</sup> A log-linear analysis with the variables level of studies, age, sex and attitude to co-habitation, found no order 4 or order 3 interactions involving the attitude to co-habitation and neither is the relationship between sex and attitude to co-habitation significant. However, there does seem to be a relationship between the sex of the young people interviewed and the opinion of their parents regarding co-habitation, since the parents are more opposed to co-habitation in the case of daughters (49%) than in the case of sons (36%) (Miguel, 1993: 326).

It must also be pointed out that taxation policies have been so insensitive to the different family situations of the tax-payers (Castellano 1998), that it has been the Courts that have forced the reform of Income Tax (sentence 45/1989 of 20 February of the Constitutional Court of Spain) or begun actions to reform the system (Higher Court of Justice of Catalonia). In recent years, a new tax model, more sensitive to the family situation of the taxpayers, has come into effect.

## THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This work is intended to be a replication of that of Gottainer and Biblarz (2000) to the extent that our data permit. That study summarized the theoretical debate on the influence of family structure on the educational achievement, occupational status and psychological welfare of children. Below we reproduce this summary (Ib: 534-536):

### **Family Structure Model**

A basic family structure model emphasizes the fundamental importance of family structure for children's attainment. Having been raised by two biological parents, or not, is the crucial determinant of child outcomes. With two parents, children will learn about the structure of authority relations and about how to successfully interact with authority figures (Nock, 1988). When that structure is removed, such as in the case of the single-parent family, parent-child relations can become more peerlike and children will not learn how to deal with power holders, and so the children will miss important, subtle lessons about how to achieve in market activity. The absence of one parent will also risk subjecting children to higher levels of parental authoritarianism or neglect and to lower levels of parental involvement and supervision (Astone & McLanahan, 1991; Bronfenbrenner, 1979; Thomson, Hanson, & McLanahan, 1994; Thomson, McLanahan, & Curtin, 1992).

The family structure model would therefore predict no differences in outcomes between children from widowed single-mother families and those from divorced single-mother families because the two share the same basic family structure. [...]

### **Household Economics Model**

The economic model views households as acting as singular units to maximize collective utility. Utility comes partly from children whose human capital is developed by parental investments in market activity and household services. The twoparent family is a particularly efficient system for maximizing utility (including that of children), because two parents provide time and money in a complementary way (Becker, 1964; Becket & Tomes, 1986).

The economic resources (and equivalent services) that parents provide determine how well the children will fare. Children from any type of single-mother household will lack the economic resources that fathers provide, and so they will not do as well as children from two-parent homes (Biblarz, Raftery, & Bucur, 1997; Bogess, 1998; McLanahan, 1985). But among single-parent families, differences in child outcomes between single divorced-mother households and single widowedmother households would be observed only if one type of household had substantially higher levels of economic resources, on average, than the other type.

### **Evolutionary Perspectives**

The evolutionary view (e.g., Emlen, 1997; Trivers, 1972) proposes that parents seek to maximize reproductive fitness through investment in children. Because the number of children women could potentially have is lower than that of men, more of the potential reproductive investment of the mother than of the father is tied up in the child or children at hand (Trivers, 1972). Accordingly, mothers will generally invest more of their resources in existing children than will fathers.

Single, divorced, and single, widowed mothers have the same level of fitness represented in their children, and so both types of mothers would have the same level of incentive to invest highly in their children. Like the economic model, the evolutionary perspective predicts that child outcomes would vary between widowed and divorced single-mother families only if the absence of the husband meant a greater loss of material resources for one type of family than the other.

Even though both divorced and widowed families experience a large decline in standard of living and family income, the decline may be particularly steep for divorced mothers (Holden & Smock, 1991).

At the government level, the benefits available to widowed and divorced mothers differ enormously. [...] [in Spain for the analyzed period, the government aid to widowed was little and nothing to divorced women (Iglesias & Meil, 2000) ]

### **The Parental Fitness Model**

Fitness models propose that the negative effect of divorce on children is a selection effect. People who divorce may have preexisting qualities--alternative value systems or a lack of competency at family life--that make both divorce and problems for children more likely (Booth, 1999). Support for this kind of perspective comes from longitudinal data showing that behavioral problems in children typically associated with divorce were actually present in the children prior to the parental divorce (Cherlin et al., 1991; Kiernan, 1997; but see Cherlin, Chase-Lansdale, and McRae, 1998). [...]

The parental fitness perspective proposes that divorce proxies for or reflects family competency in a way that widowhood does not. Competency involves parental behavior, but it may also involve value orientations (Popenoe, 1996). Widowed mothers will have more traditional family values and lifestyles than divorced mothers. Unlike single mothers who divorce, widowed single mothers did not choose an alternative family structure for themselves and their children. The kinds of values and lifestyles held by widows will be more beneficial to children's success in the larger society than will the alternative values of divorcees. For all of these reasons, the parental fitness perspective predicts that children from widowed single-mother families will do substantially better than will children from divorced single-mother homes.

### **The Marital Conflict Model**

Another kind of selection hypothesis is that children who experience their parents' divorce are likely to have had prolonged exposure to conflict between their parents. Open conflict between parents is frightening and distressing for children and can have both short- and long-term negative effects on self-esteem and educational attainment (Amato, 1986, 1993; Amato & Booth, 1997; Emery, 1982). Children from widowed single-mother homes would be expected to do substantially better than would those from divorced single-mother homes because they will have been less likely, on average, to have had prolonged exposure to parental conflict.

In addition, the experiences surrounding divorce and the father's moving out of the residential household often lead to the development of hostile feelings toward the father on the part of the children (Parish & Kappes, 1980; Rozondal, 1983; Wallerstein & Kelly, 1980). In contrast, when fathers die, children tend to develop warm and positive inner constructions of their fathers (Silverman, Nickman, & Worden, 1992). [...]

These theories make competing predictions about the effects on children of single-mother families produced by the death of a parent rather than by divorce. Some (the parental fitness and marital conflict perspectives) argue that there are differences in competencies, child-centeredness, and values between mothers whose husbands died and parents who got divorced and that as a result, there are differences in the success of their children. Others (the economic and evolutionary perspectives) propose that differences in child outcomes across types of single-mother families can be accounted for more by the contrasting structural positions of families than by cultural positions or psychological functioning. The baseline family structure perspective predicts that the single-parent family structures will have roughly the same effect on children, irrespective of the underlying processes that gave rise to them.

The source of the data employed is the Sociodemographic Survey (Instituto Nacional de Estadística -gubernamental agency-). It consists of a cross-section sample comprising 157.100 Spanish citizens aged 10 or more. In the questionnaire there are questions on the beginnings and end points of certain life-cycle process, concerning education, labour-market, partnership, as well as social background variables. The information available is: age when formal education is started and put to an end, age at which cohabitation with partners began or finished, age of entering and exiting the labour market, number of children and age of parenthood, current employment, social background (parents' education level, parent's social class, type of family), residence's town size.

With our data, we limited ourselves to studying educational achievement and status achievement, hence we can only distinguish between three groups of predictions associated with these models. The following Table summarizes the differences we can establish with our data.

<b>Model</b>	<b>Predictions: differences betewen divorce and widow</b>
Family Structure Model	No differences
Economic & Evolucionary	Only differents if resources are different
Family Fitness & Marital Conflict	Divorce is ever the worst

This issues has been studied to Spain by Ruíz (1999), and he reviewed the few works about this question to Spain; but in this paper this is research with more details.

## **DATA ANALYSIS**

### **DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA**

As dependent variables we took three educational levels: primary completion, secondary completion and college completion, which correspond to educational levels 1b, 2b y 3b of the CASMIN project (Comparative Analysis of Social Mobility in Industrial Nations), proposed by Erikson, König, Lüttinger Müller (1988), and recently updated for the United Kingdom, France and Germany (Brauns & Steinmann, 1999); the adaptation of the classification of CASMIN studies for the socio-demographic survey can be found in Martínez (1996a). We also took the professional prestige of the first occupation of the person interviewed. This variable was elaborated based on the PRESCA-2 prestige scale (Carabaña & Gómez, 1996), and adapted for the Sociodemographic Survey by Martínez (1996b). This is a cardinal prestige scale, in which those interviewed have evaluated the prestige of a subset of occupations<sup>42</sup>; the same scale was used for the mother's occupation.

The distributions of the dependent variables by the birth cohorts of those interviewed are given below.

In Table 1 it is possible to appreciate that the divorce effect is more negative than the widowhood effect in all birth cohorts. The worst family structure for completing primary level seems be family with stepfather. This may contradict Parson's family structure model, because, on the one hand, there are differences between families with both father and mother (biological or stepfather), and, on the other hand, there are differences between families without a father (due to death or due to divorce).

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<sup>42</sup> The regression of this scale on the mean income and educational level of the occupations gives an R2 of 0.9, with coefficients of 0.5 for both variables, i.e. this prestige scale can be understood as an index of socio-economic status.

TABLE 1 PRIMARY COMPLETION (CASMIN 1B) BY FAMILY STRUCTURE AND BIRTH COHORT

		FAMILY STRUCTURE					TOTAL
		BIOLOGICAL MOTHER FATHER	SINGLE- & MOTHER HOUSHOLD DUE DIVORCE	SINGLE- MOTHER HOUSEHOLD TODUE WIDOWHOOD	SINGLE- MOTHER HOUSEHOLD WITH TOSTEPFATHER	OTHER FAMILIES	
BIRTH COHORT	1907-41	% 55.4%	49.4%	50.3%	41.1%	47.9%	53.7%
		N 20986	472	2896	102	3027	27483
	1942-51	% 77.3%	69.0%	73.0%	58.0%	72.3%	76.4%
		N 13529	182	941	46	1376	16073
1952-61	% 86.3%	81.9%	80.8%	71.4%	80.2%	85.6%	
	N 18430	208	956	48	1312	20954	
1962-66	% 85.5%	73.8%	81.2%	87.0%	73.4%	84.6%	
	N 10938	131	498	27	466	12061	
TOTAL	%	71.4%	60.2%	59.8%	52.4%	58.9%	69.0%
	N	63884	992	5291	224	6180	76570

SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY 1991 (NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, (INE))

The influence of family structure on completion of a secondary academic level is more or less similar to its influence on completing primary level, as we can see in Table 2. There is a difference in the youngest birth cohort: the effect of single mother households due to divorce or due to widowhood is similar. In each birth cohort, there are too few cases of single-mothers with stepfathers to be able to say anything about them; but for the whole of this sample, this family structure is more negative than single-mother households due to divorce.

Table 2 SECONDARY ACADEMIC COMPLETION (CASMIN 2b) BY FAMILY STRUCTURE AND BIRTH COHORT

		FAMILY STRUCTURE					TOTAL
		BIOLOGICAL MOTHER FATHER	SINGLE- & MOTHER HOUSHOLD DUE DIVORCE	SINGLE- MOTHER HOUSEHOLD TODUE WIDOWHOOD	SINGLE- MOTHER HOUSEHOLD WITH TOSTEPFATHER	OTHER FAMILIES	
BIRTH COHORT	1907-41	% 17.2%	13.9%	17.9%	13.0%	16.4%	17.1%
		N 3603	65	517	13	496	4695
	1942-51	% 31.2%	16.3%	30.0%	13.5%	29.8%	30.8%
		N 4217	30	282	6	409	4943
1952-61	% 42.4%	21.9%	34.8%	20.2%	31.9%	41.1%	
	N 7810	46	333	10	418	8616	
1962-66	% 39.9%	33.6%	31.4%	16.9%	27.9%	39.0%	
	N 4364	44	156	5	130	4699	
TOTAL	%	31.3%	18.6%	24.4%	15.2%	23.5%	30.0%
	N	19993	184	1288	34	1454	22953

SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY 1991 (NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, (INE))

Similar to the other educational level, divorce is worse than the loss of the father through death for the level of educational attainment. Unlike other levels, loss of father by death and biological mother and father are more similar (Table 3).

Table 3 COLLEGE COMPLETION (CASMIN 3b) BY FAMILY STRUCTURE AND BIRTH COHORT

		FAMILY STRUCTURE					TOTAL
		BIOLOGICAL MOTHER FATHER	SINGLE- & MOTHER HOUSHOLD DUE DIVORCE	SINGLE- MOTHER HOUSEHOLD TODUE WIDOWHOOD	SINGLE- MOTHER HOUSEHOLD WITH TOSTEPFATHER	OTHER FAMILIES	
BIRTH COHORT	1907-41	% 44.9%	22.3%	47.9%	19.2%	46.1%	45.0%
		N 1618	15	248	3	229	2111
	1942-51	% 42.8%	32.8%	39.2%	16.7%	41.6%	42.4%
		N 1806	10	111	1	170	2097
1952-61	% 42.2%	37.4%	36.8%	21.7%	34.7%	41.5%	
	N 3293	17	123	2	145	3580	
1962-66	% 45.7%	25.1%	40.5%	12.4%	38.2%	45.1%	
	N 1993	11	63	1	50	2118	
TOTAL	%	43.6%	28.4%	42.2%	18.5%	40.8%	43.2%
	N	8710	52	544	6	594	9906

SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY 1991 (NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, (INE))

In Table 4 we can see a slight influence of the family structure on the professional prestige of the first occupation of those interviewed. In almost all the birth cohorts this variation tends towards orphans having slightly more prestige than the children of separated or divorced parents. The exception to this norm can be found in the youngest cohort, in which the prestige of the children of divorced parents is slightly higher than that of children who have lost their father through death.

Table 4 1st OCCUPATIONAL PROFESSIONAL PRESTIGE BY BIRTH COHORT AND FAMILY STRUCTURE

1st. OCCUPATIONAL PROFESSIONAL PRESTIGE	BIRTH COHORT		FAMILY STRUCTURE					TOTAL
			BIOLOGICAL MOTHER FATHER	SINGLE- & MOTHER HOUSEHOLD DUE DIVORCE	SINGLE- MOTHER HOUSEHOLD TODUE WIDOWHOOD	SINGLE- MOTHER WITH TO STEPFATHER	OTHER FAMILIES	
	1907-41	MEAN	81.1	79.7	81.8	76.3	79.9	81.0
		STD.DEV.	27.9	21.3	27.1	18.7	25.3	27.4
		N	30142	812	4883	210	5264	41311
	1942-51	MEAN	90.9	84.5	87.5	76.6	88.0	90.3
		STD.DEV.	31.7	24.1	27.8	23.8	29.0	31.1
		N	15302	233	1194	71	1709	18509
	1952-61	MEAN	95.1	85.7	91.0	85.5	89.7	94.4
		STD.DEV.	32.9	25.1	28.6	18.9	28.1	32.4
		N	19429	228	1100	63	1484	22304
	1962-66	MEAN	93.5	91.4	89.9	83.3	88.4	93.1
		STD.DEV.	32.2	29.0	26.9	23.2	25.5	31.7
		N	11044	154	549	26	533	12308
TOTAL		MEAN	88.5	82.7	84.6	78.4	83.5	87.6
		STD.DEV.	31.3	23.7	27.6	20.4	26.9	30.5
		N	75917	1427	7727	371	8991	94433

SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY 1991 (NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, (INE))

As regards the independent variables, we would like to highlight the importance of the mother's participation in the workforce when the person interviewed is sixteen years old, leaving the presentation of the distribution of the remaining variables for the appendix. This is due to the interaction of this variable with family structure, as we can see in Table 5, where the activity rate of divorced women is greater than that of other mothers, a difference which increases in the youngest cohorts. At first this seems to reflect greater economic precariousness in these families, which would force these mothers to a greater extent into the labor market. The mothers with a lower rate of activity are those in families with both biological parents.

Table 5 MOTHER LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION BY FAMILY STRUCTURE AND BIRTH COHORT

BIRTH COHORT		FAMILY STRUCTURE					TOTAL	
		BIOLOGICAL MOTHER FATHER	SINGLE- & MOTHER HOUSEHOLD DUE DIVORCE	SINGLE- MOTHER HOUSEHOLD TODUE WIDOWHOOD	SINGLE- MOTHER WITH TO STEPFATHER	OTHER FAMILIES		
1907-41	%	14,4%	36,8%	23,7%	27,4%	13,5%	15,8%	
	N	6739	449	1708	87	1086	10069	
1942-51	%	14,0%	48,3%	25,7%	29,0%	14,5%	15,3%	
	N	2074	113	293	18	237	2735	
1952-61	%	12,9%	45,2%	26,2%	25,4%	17,6%	14,2%	
	N	3024	122	346	16	306	3814	
1962-66	%	14,4%	44,0%	24,6%	27,3%	18,4%	15,5%	
	N	1808	81	167	9	135	2200	
TOTAL		%	14,0%	40,1%	24,3%	27,4%	14,5%	15,4%
		N	13645	765	2514	130	1764	18818

SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY 1991 (NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, (INE))

*VARIABLES IN MODELS*

**-Family structure:** we have taken into account those interviewed who grew up in families with both biological parents, only with the mother because of divorce and only with the mother because of widowhood. Since divorce was prohibited during most of the period analysed, those who grew up in families that had undergone this process were few, and there were only a few more who grew up in families that had undergone a de facto separation. Very few of the mothers married again, hence we have not differentiated between stepfathers because of divorce or because of widowhood<sup>43</sup>. Another category was made for the rest of the families.

**-Educational level of the mother:** this was considered in eight categories and treated as a continuous variable, since a prior study indicated that it is good modeling. [Martínez 2002]. These categories are the following: 1 illiterate, 2 no formal schooling, 3 unfinished primary, 4 primary level, 5, first level of secondary, 6, second level of secondary, 7 first level college, 8, second level college, as can be seen in the appendix.

-Moreover, we added other variables that allowed us a better knowledge of the process of educational achievement as well as enabling us to control for family resources. These variables are labor activity of the mother, her professional prestige, and the number of siblings. As Kalmijn [1994] pointed out, the **professional prestige of the mothers and their labour activity** should be considered together, since the effects of the mother's job are positive inasmuch as they provide more monetary resources for the home, but negative inasmuch as they reduce the time devoted to the care and supervision of the children, time which is not compensated by a greater dedication of the father to these activities.

-As regards number of **siblings**<sup>44</sup>, in the previous study mentioned Martínez (2002) it was found that there were no differences in educational achievement between those with four siblings and those with more, hence we decided to limit the variable at 4.

Furthermore, we took into account the **birth cohort**. Among those born between 1907 and 1941, educational achievement remained more or less constant, to then expand afterwards. This expansion was slightly curbed by the 1973 educational reform which made the criteria for obtaining the certificate for primary studies more difficult. We divided the period analysed into the following: 1907-41, 1942-51, 1952-1961 and 1962-66. The first cohort was formed as such owing to the stability of stated educational achievement; next, the post-war generation, which joined the educational system and workforce during a time of economic recession; subsequently, the generation that corresponded approximately to the beginning of economic expansion, and

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<sup>43</sup> This typology was elaborated based on the variable whose presentation is shown in the paper... Owing to the complexity of the socio-demographic survey and to the problems of data purification, certain verifications to ensure their appropriate construction are still pending.

<sup>44</sup> In Teelman et al. [2002] we find a recent review of the discussion concerning the number of siblings and its effects on educational achievement. According to the dilution hypothesis, a greater number of siblings reduces resources per capita, which in turn reduces educational achievement. According to the confluence hypothesis, the place occupied among the siblings must be taken into account, since it interacts with the resources of the home, as well as with the care of the children and the relationship between them. For our part, in a previous study with this survey [Martínez 2002] we concluded that the dilution hypothesis seems more on the mark than the confluence hypothesis, after finding that the order of the siblings has practically no effect on educational achievement. Therefore, in this study the number of siblings is being taken as an indicator of family resources. In any case, the results presented in Martínez (2002) are not conclusive inasmuch as not all the possibilities of the composition of the siblings were explored (such as density –years between sibling- and sex).

finally the generation that went to school under the General Education Law, a more comprehensive educational law.

### **Estimation of the models**

Three models were estimated.

- 1) With the same variables that appear in Biblarz and Gottainer (2000), with family structure, sex of those interviewed and level of studies of the mother (the ethnic component was excluded owing to the great homogeneity there is in Spain, although this is now beginning to change).
- 2) We added indicators of family resources: professional prestige of the mother, and whether she was working when the interviewee was 16, as well as the number of siblings<sup>3</sup>.
- 3) We incorporated interactions between birth cohorts and the remaining variables introduced in previous steps.

The corresponding reference categories were as follows: interviewee living with biological parents at age 16, born between 1907 and 1941, male whose mother was not economically active when he was sixteen. We included a dummy variable to control for those observations with missing values in any of the independent variables.

## **RESULTS**

[results for status attainment is in progress]

### *Effect of family structure*

In the panel 1, panel 2, and panel 3 it can be seen that our results seem to point rather towards a theory of the specificity of the effects of divorce (family fitness and marital conflict). This is especially seen as regards completing primary studies, since in the first model there are no differences between divorce and widowhood (parameter around -.18 for both dummy variables), but once controls are added for household resources (number of siblings and professional prestige of the mother), these differences do appear (-.39 and -.17, respectively). If we take into account the interactions with the birth cohort, we can see that the effects for these two family structures are practically constant, perhaps with the exception of the cohorts born between 1942 and 1951, in which the statistical significance is weak (p-value $\approx$ .1).

In the case of completing secondary education, the effects of divorce and widowhood are still significant, and more negative for divorce. Unlike what occurs with completing primary level, these effects do not now seem so confused with resources, since the parameters for this type of family do not vary when the resources variables are introduced. If we take into account interactions with the birth cohort, these effects seem to have been more negative for those from divorced families born between 1942-1951 and for orphans born between 1952-1966.

The results for completing college are very similar to those for secondary level, i.e. significant, more negative for the children of divorced parents and independent of the variables that measure resources. For the cohort born between 1952 and 1961 the effect of widowhood does not seem to be relevant, whereas for the youngest cohort (1962-66) it is slightly more negative. The effect of divorce remains more or less constant.

Hence, all these results tend to emphasize the importance of the differential effects of divorce on educational achievement, in agreement with the theories of family fitness and marital conflict, and against the economic model and the evolutionary model, on the one hand, and the family structure model, on the other.

Next the results for the remaining variables are given. The commentary is brief since we will not go into comparisons with the predictions that can be derived from different sociological hypotheses, as is done in the study directed by Shavit and Blossfeld [1993], a task which we shall leave for later.

#### *Effect of the cohorts*

The parameters for the cohorts reflect the expansion of the educational system, but apparently this is curbed in the youngest cohort, as can be seen in the first model of the logit of completing primary level, but the incorporation of interactions seems to indicate that the net effect of the last cohort is greater than in the other cohorts, as can be seen in model 3. As regards secondary level education, the greatest parameter is for the generation born in 1952 and 1961, in all the models. At college level we note that in the oldest cohort more finished college level once they had finished secondary level; if we take into account the margins of error for the estimations of each parameter ( $b(2 * S.E.)$  for a confidence level of 95.5%, supposed simple random sampling), no significant differences are noted for those born between 1942 and 1966. Hence, it seems that when the proportion of those completing studies at lower levels increases, the proportion of those completing studies at higher levels decreases.

#### *Educational level of the mother*

As regards the mother's educational level, we can see that its effect is the strongest in relative terms ( $b/(S.E.)$ ), after that of birth cohorts. In those who complete primary studies the effect decreases, as can be seen in the interactions for the youngest cohort. In secondary education the effect is more or less constant, with a certain ambiguity in the parameter for the cohort born between 1952 and 1961. As regards college level, the evolution of the parameter is a bell curve, since the influence of the level of studies of the mother increases until the cohort born in 1952-61, and then is not significant.

#### *Sex*

The same as in other countries of the OECD, a drastic change can be observed in the academic level achieved by women, who have gone from having a lower level than men to a higher level in the youngest cohorts. This result is clearly observed in the three educational levels studied.

#### *Professional prestige and economic activity of the mother*

These two variables should be interpreted together since the negative effect of the mother's activity is compensated by the positive effect of the prestige of her occupation in the first two educational levels. This is so to such an extent that if we estimate the probability expected for a non-working mother and for another who works in an occupation whose prestige is the average prestige for working mothers, we find practically no differences as regards the probability of overcoming an educational transition. This compensation seems to indicate that the contribution

of the mother's work to the socio-economic level of the family during the period analysed is not so much an improvement as a maintaining of this status. In other words, mothers who work probably do so because of a family difficulty and in order to maintain a mean status level, not to improve their position with respect to the mean level of other families.

In college completion the influence of the occupational prestige of the mother and of educational achievement is smaller, which is consistent with the hypotheses that emphasize the importance of the mother's work in the care of the children, since at college age the maternal figure is less important. This lesser influence can be seen both in the fact that the parameters estimated are smaller and in the fact that they are only significant for the cohort born between 1907 and 1941 (since they are statistically significant and of the opposite sign, the parameters for interactions cancel the effects of these variables; there is an exception for the mother's activity in the 1952-61 cohort).

### *Sibship size*

The negative effect of sibship size is greater in primary completion (-.31), especially in the youngest cohorts (the interactions are significant and with a negative sign). In secondary academic completion the effect is smaller (-.2) and constant in all the cohorts (the interactions are not significant at 5%). In college completion, the effect is only significant for the two youngest cohorts (born between 1952 and 1966). This could be due to the importance of the resources in the primary school, and a great relevance of family characteristic for the younger cohorts.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

In the first part of this paper it's said than low divorces rates in Spain are due to Spain is familiaristic welfare model (Sping-Andersen). This model explain better the spanish family characteristics than the catholic norms. In Spain, there are high rates of people who said are catholic, and we may explain why they have low divorce rates, but also why they have low fertility rate, against Pope recomends.

In the second part, regarding the study of the effects of divorce on educational achievement, our estimations seem to favor the theories that emphasize the specificity of divorce versus other types of family structures, such as the theories of family fitness and marital conflict. Inasmuch as the mother's education level, her participation in the workforce and the number of siblings of the interviewee are proxies of household resources, we can consider that the differential effect of divorce, once these resources have been controlled for, contradicts the economic and evolutionary models, although we would need a more adequate modelling of the household resources for our conclusions to be stronger. It seems that the family structure model can be more easily rejected, since differential effects are observed in families with the same structure.

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<http://www.oecd.org/els/edu/eag98/Tables/A2.xls> in table A2.2c)
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PANEL 1

n=110.920

-2log0=109450

-2 log de la verosimilitud VAR DEP: FINISHED PRIMARYSCHOOL	Resumen de los modelos																			
	MODEL 1				MODEL 2				MODEL 3				MODEL 4							
	110920				107527. 110920				107239. . 110920				107135 CON 75 GL							
	B	S.E.	Sig.	e <sup>b</sup>	B	S.E.	Sig.	e <sup>b</sup>	B	S.E.	Sig.	e <sup>b</sup>	B	E.T.	Sig.	e <sup>b</sup>				
CONSTANT	-1.02	0.03	0.00	0.36	-0.29	0.04	0.00	0.75	-0.05	0.05	0.31	0.95	0.08	0.08	0.29	1.09	-0.30	0.07	0.00	0.74
FAMILY TYPE			0.00				0.00				0.00				0.00				0.00	
MOTHER DUE SEP. OR DIV.	-0.19	0.06	0.00	0.83	-0.39	0.06	0.00	0.68	-0.47	0.08	0.00	0.63	-0.53	0.11	0.00	0.59	-0.44	0.11	0.00	0.65
MOTHER DUE WIDOWHOOD	-0.18	0.03	0.00	0.83	-0.21	0.03	0.00	0.81	-0.17	0.04	0.00	0.84	-0.19	0.06	0.00	0.83	-0.22	0.06	0.00	0.80
MOTHER-STEPFATHER	-0.53	0.11	0.00	0.59	-0.56	0.11	0.00	0.57	-0.33	0.17	0.06	0.72	0.09	0.29	0.76	1.09	-0.37	0.23	0.12	0.69
OTHER FAMILIES	-0.32	0.02	0.00	0.72	-0.35	0.02	0.00	0.70	-0.37	0.04	0.00	0.69	-0.22	0.06	0.00	0.80	-0.44	0.05	0.00	0.64
BIRHT COHORT (1907-41 REF.)			0.00				0.00				0.00				0.00				0.00	
1942-51	0.82	0.02	0.00	2.27	0.77	0.02	0.00	2.16	1.01	0.10	0.00	2.76	1.03	0.14	0.00	2.81	0.84	0.14	0.00	2.33
1952-61	1.32	0.02	0.00	3.76	1.27	0.02	0.00	3.55	1.74	0.11	0.00	5.71	2.13	0.20	0.00	8.42	1.66	0.15	0.00	5.26
1962-66	1.08	0.03	0.00	2.94	1.01	0.03	0.00	2.74	1.91	0.16	0.00	6.75	2.04	0.22	0.00	7.71	2.17	0.20	0.00	8.75
MOTHER'S EDUCATION	0.86	0.01	0.00	2.37	0.83	0.01	0.00	2.30	0.80	0.01	0.00	2.24	0.78	0.01	0.00	2.19	0.83	0.01	0.00	2.30
(MISSING M.E.)	2.85	0.08	0.00	17.32	2.60	0.08	0.00	13.44	2.64	0.08	0.00	14.02	2.74	0.12	0.00	15.46	2.54	0.10	0.00	12.70
FEMALE	-0.04	0.00	0.00	0.96	-0.04	0.00	0.00	0.96	-0.03	0.00	0.00	0.97	****		****	****			****	****
MOTHER'S OCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE					0.10	0.01	0.00	1.10	0.10	0.01	0.00	1.10	0.09	0.02	0.00	1.09	0.09	0.02	0.00	1.10
MOTHER'S LABOR ACTIVITY					-0.86	0.09	0.00	0.42	-0.89	0.10	0.00	0.41	-0.82	0.14	0.00	0.44	-0.87	0.13	0.00	0.42
SIBSIZE					-0.25	0.01	0.00	0.78	-0.31	0.01	0.00	0.74	-0.31	0.01	0.00	0.74	-0.32	0.01	0.00	0.73
(MISSING M.O.P.)					0.59	0.16	0.00	1.80	0.60	0.16	0.00	1.83	0.57	0.25	0.02	1.77	0.60	0.21	0.00	1.81
COHORT *MOTHER'S EDUCATION											0.00				0.00				0.06	
*1942-51									0.03	0.02	0.16	1.03	0.03	0.03	0.31	1.03	0.02	0.03	0.52	1.02
*1952-61									-0.03	0.02	0.13	0.97	-0.10	0.03	0.00	0.90	0.04	0.03	0.15	1.04
*1962-66									-0.17	0.02	0.00	0.84	-0.28	0.03	0.00	0.76	-0.07	0.03	0.04	0.93
COHORTE*FEMALE											0.00		****		****				****	****
*1942-51									-0.03	0.01	0.00	0.97								
*1952-61									0.00	0.01	0.58	1.00								

*1962-66	0.07	0.01	0.00	1.07	*****				*****		****	
COHORT*MOTHER'S OCCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE			0.17				0.14				0.90	
*1942-51	0.03	0.02	0.25	1.03	0.04	0.04	0.28	1.04	-0.01	0.03	0.70	0.99
*1952-61	0.01	0.03	0.73	1.01	0.02	0.04	0.70	1.02	0.02	0.03	0.58	1.02
*1962-66	-0.04	0.03	0.11	0.96	-0.06	0.04	0.10	0.94	-0.01	0.04	0.85	0.99
COHORT*MOTHER'S LABOR ACTIVITY			0.25				0.25				0.79	
*1942-51	-0.27	0.20	0.16	0.76	-0.41	0.29	0.16	0.67	0.15	0.27	0.57	1.17
*1952-61	-0.21	0.21	0.31	0.81	-0.29	0.33	0.38	0.75	-0.20	0.27	0.46	0.82
*1962-66	0.20	0.23	0.40	1.22	0.29	0.33	0.39	1.34	0.03	0.31	0.91	1.03
COHORTE*SIBSIZE			0.00				0.00				0.00	
*1942-51	-0.07	0.02	0.00	0.94	-0.04	0.02	0.11	0.96	-0.07	0.02	0.00	0.93
*1952-61	-0.14	0.02	0.00	0.87	-0.14	0.03	0.00	0.87	-0.15	0.02	0.00	0.86
*1962-66	-0.18	0.02	0.00	0.83	-0.13	0.03	0.00	0.87	-0.26	0.03	0.00	0.77
COHORT*FAMILY STRUCTURE			0.01				0.02				0.62	
SEPARATION OR DIVORCE*1942-51	-0.27	0.17	0.10	0.76	-0.03	0.25	0.91	0.97	-0.24	0.23	0.30	0.78
SEPARATION OR DIVORCE*1952-61	0.09	0.08	0.23	1.10	0.00	0.12	0.99	1.00	0.05	0.11	0.63	1.06
SEPARATION OR DIVORCE*1962-66	0.24	0.29	0.42	1.27	0.57	0.41	0.16	1.77	0.00	0.46	1.00	1.00
WIDOWHOOD*1942-51	0.11	0.07	0.10	1.12	0.02	0.11	0.87	1.02	0.05	0.09	0.61	1.05
WIDOWHOOD*1952-61	0.07	0.19	0.71	1.07	-0.23	0.27	0.41	0.80	0.25	0.27	0.36	1.28
WIDOWHOOD*1962-66	-0.03	0.09	0.77	0.97	-0.10	0.13	0.42	0.90	-0.07	0.12	0.58	0.94
STEEPFATHER*1942-51	-0.32	0.33	0.33	0.72	1.08	0.78	0.16	2.95	-0.44	0.48	0.35	0.64
STEEPFATHER*1952-61	0.09	0.08	0.24	1.09	0.24	0.13	0.06	1.28	0.12	0.10	0.21	1.13
STEEPFATHER*1962-66	-0.47	0.20	0.02	0.62	-0.43	0.27	0.11	0.65	-0.34	0.30	0.26	0.71
OTHER FAMILIES*1942-51	0.15	0.12	0.20	1.16	0.24	0.16	0.13	1.27	-0.05	0.16	0.77	0.95
OTHER FAMILIES*1952-61	1.29	0.58	0.03	3.63	1.33	0.82	0.11	3.80	0.94	0.71	0.19	2.55
OTHER FAMILIES*1962-66	-0.22	0.11	0.04	0.80	-0.42	0.17	0.01	0.65	-0.12	0.13	0.34	0.89

**PANEL 2**

n=57072

-2log0=84411

**VAR DEP.: SECONDARY ACADEMIC FINISHED**

-2 log de la verosimilitud	MODEL 1				MODEL 2				MODEL 3				MODEL 4							
	80770				79525				79041				MALE		FEMALE					
	B	E.T.	Sig.	e <sup>b</sup>	B	E.T.	Sig.	e <sup>b</sup>	B	E.T.	Sig.	e <sup>b</sup>	B	E.T.	Sig.	e <sup>b</sup>				
CONSTANT	-2.43	0.05	0.00	0.88	-2.47	0.50	0.00	0.09	-2.53	0.06	0.00	0.08	-2.42	0.08	0.00	0.09	-2.79	0.08	0.00	0.06
FAMILY TYPE			0.00				0.00				0.00				0.00				0.00	
MOTHER DUE SEP. OR DIV.	-0.53	0.09	0.00	0.59	-0.60	0.09	0.00	0.55	-0.62	0.10	0.00	0.54	-0.78	0.14	0.00	0.46	-0.41	0.13	0.00	0.67
MOTHER DUE WIDOWHOOD	-0.10	0.04	0.01	0.91	-0.08	0.04	0.03	0.92	-0.10	0.04	0.02	0.91	-0.14	0.06	0.01	0.87	0.02	0.06	0.75	1.02
MOTHER-STEPFATHER	-0.72	0.20	0.00	0.49	-0.72	0.20	0.00	0.48	-0.79	0.21	0.00	0.45	-0.42	0.33	0.20	0.66	-0.88	0.32	0.01	0.41
OTHER FAMILIES	-0.20	0.03	0.00	0.82	-0.19	0.03	0.00	0.82	-0.26	0.04	0.00	0.77	-0.10	0.05	0.08	0.91	-0.30	0.05	0.00	0.74
BIRHT COHORT (1907-41 REF.)			0.00				0.00				0.00				0.00				0.00	
1942-51	0.67	0.02	0.00	1.96	0.63	0.03	0.00	1.87	0.40	0.15	0.01	1.49	0.52	0.18	0.01	1.68	0.69	0.24	0.00	2.00
1952-61	1.09	0.02	0.00	2.99	1.05	0.02	0.00	2.84	0.56	0.13	0.00	1.75	0.81	0.16	0.00	2.24	1.01	0.21	0.00	2.75
1962-66	0.83	0.03	0.00	2.30	0.77	0.03	0.00	2.15	0.04	0.17	0.80	1.04	0.02	0.27	0.93	1.02	1.33	0.22	0.00	3.80
MOTHER'S EDUCATION	0.65	0.01	0.00	1.92	0.64	0.01	0.00	1.89	0.64	0.01	0.00	1.90	0.61	0.01	0.00	1.85	0.65	0.01	0.00	1.91
(MISSING M.E.)	2.66	0.10	0.00	14.33	2.50	0.10	0.00	12.19	2.52	0.11	0.00	12.41	2.34	0.14	0.00	10.38	2.36	0.17	0.00	10.63
FEMALE	-0.05	0.00	0.00	0.96	-0.05	0.00	0.00	0.96	-0.04	0.00	0.00	0.96	****	***		****	****			
MOTHER'S OCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE					0.10	0.01	0.00	1.11	0.10	0.01	0.00	1.11	0.11	0.01	0.00	1.12	0.09	0.01	0.00	1.10
MOTHER'S LABOR ACTIVITY					-1.28	0.08	0.00	0.28	-1.28	0.08	0.00	14.02	-1.41	0.12	0.00	0.24	-1.21	0.11	0.00	0.30
SIBSIZE					-0.21	0.01	0.00	0.81	-0.20	0.01	0.00	0.82	-0.21	0.01	0.00	0.81	-0.20	0.01	0.00	0.82
(MISSING M.O.P.)					1.51	0.17	0.00	4.53	1.51	0.17	0.00	4.54	1.54	0.24	0.00	4.67	1.49	0.24	0.00	4.44
COHORT *MOTHER'S EDUCATION									0.25						0.72				0.73	
*1942-51									-0.03	0.02	0.17	0.97	0.02	0.03	0.58	1.02	0.01	0.03	0.82	1.01
*1952-61									-0.04	0.02	0.06	0.96	-0.01	0.03	0.62	0.99	0.03	0.03	0.27	1.03
*1962-66									-0.01	0.02	0.56	0.99	-0.02	0.03	0.58	0.98	0.01	0.03	0.67	1.01
COHORTE*FEMALE									0.00			0.00	***		0.00	****				
*1942-51									0.06	0.01	0.00	1.06								
*1952-61									0.10	0.01	0.00	1.10								
*1962-66									0.17	0.01	0.00	1.18			****				****	

COHORT*MOTHER'S OCCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE			0.20				0.15				0.84	
*1942-51	0.01	0.02	0.48	1.02	0.00	0.03	0.93	1.00	-0.02	0.03	0.53	0.98
*1952-61	0.00	0.02	1.00	1.00	-0.02	0.03	0.57	0.98	0.00	0.03	0.85	1.00
*1962-66	-0.03	0.02	0.15	0.97	-0.07	0.03	0.04	0.94	-0.02	0.03	0.44	0.98
COHORT*MOTHER'S LABOR ACTIVITY			0.01				0.02				0.21	
*1942-51	-0.05	0.20	0.81	0.95	0.05	0.29	0.87	1.05	0.26	0.29	0.37	1.30
*1952-61	0.37	0.19	0.05	1.45	0.48	0.26	0.06	1.61	0.47	0.25	0.06	1.60
*1962-66	0.55	0.22	0.01	1.73	0.82	0.31	0.01	2.28	0.51	0.29	0.08	1.67
COHORTE*SIBSIZE			0.09				0.21				0.43	
*1942-51	-0.01	0.02	0.66	0.99	-0.04	0.03	0.12	0.96	0.03	0.03	0.29	1.03
*1952-61	-0.03	0.02	0.07	0.97	-0.03	0.02	0.20	0.97	-0.01	0.02	0.58	0.99
*1962-66	0.02	0.02	0.40	1.02	0.02	0.03	0.62	1.02	0.01	0.03	0.61	1.01
COHORT*FAMILY STRUCTURE			0.00				0.10				0.01	
SEPARATION OR DIVORCE*1942-51	-0.65	0.27	0.02	0.52	-0.97	0.40	0.01	0.38	-0.06	0.38	0.87	0.94
SEPARATION OR DIVORCE*1952-61	0.03	0.10	0.76	1.03	0.03	0.14	0.85	1.03	-0.09	0.15	0.54	0.91
SEPARATION OR DIVORCE*1962-66	-0.41	0.54	0.44	0.66	0.15	0.63	0.82	1.16	-0.56	0.95	0.55	0.57
WIDOWHOOD*1942-51	0.05	0.09	0.54	1.06	0.01	0.12	0.96	1.01	0.15	0.13	0.26	1.16
WIDOWHOOD*1952-61	-0.69	0.23	0.00	0.50	-0.59	0.30	0.05	0.55	-0.32	0.33	0.34	0.73
WIDOWHOOD*1962-66	-0.27	0.09	0.00	0.76	-0.10	0.12	0.39	0.90	-0.17	0.13	0.18	0.84
STEEPFATHER*1942-51	-0.84	0.48	0.08	0.43	-0.10	0.55	0.86	0.91	-1.10	0.83	0.19	0.33
STEEPFATHER*1952-61	-0.31	0.09	0.00	0.74	-0.13	0.11	0.24	0.88	-0.27	0.12	0.02	0.76
STEEPFATHER*1962-66	-0.05	0.25	0.86	0.96	-0.50	0.36	0.17	0.61	0.41	0.36	0.26	1.51
OTHER FAMILIES*1942-51	-0.22	0.12	0.07	0.80	-0.43	0.16	0.01	0.65	0.14	0.17	0.41	1.15
OTHER FAMILIES*1952-61	-0.61	0.63	0.34	0.54	-0.68	1.13	0.54	0.50	0.78	0.78	0.32	2.18
OTHER FAMILIES*1962-66	-0.42	0.13	0.00	0.65	-0.23	0.18	0.19	0.79	-0.31	0.16	0.05	0.73

**Panel 3**

n=40305

-2log likelihood0=

	MODEL 1				MODEL 2				MODEL 3				MODEL 4							
	15189				15176				15087				MALE		FEMALE					
	B	S.E.	Sig.	e <sup>b</sup>	B	S.E.	Sig.	e <sup>b</sup>	B	S.E.	Sig.	e <sup>b</sup>	B	S.E.	Sig.	e <sup>b</sup>				
-2log likelihood																				
<b>VAR DEP.: COLLEGE COMPLETION</b>																				
CONSTANT	-1.54	0.10	0.00	0.21	-1.48	0.11	0.00	0.23	-1.50	0.12	0.00	0.22	-1.59	0.43	0.00	0.20	-1.20	0.32	0.00	0.30
FAMILY TYPE			0.00				0.00				0.00				0.08				0.22	
MOTHER DUE SEP. OR DIV.	-0.77	0.17	0.00	0.46	-0.77	0.17	0.00	0.46	-0.69	0.17	0.00	0.50	-0.67	0.27	0.01	0.51	-0.40	0.22	0.07	0.67
MOTHER DUE WIDOWHOOD	-0.08	0.06	0.20	0.93	-0.06	0.06	0.31	0.94	-0.10	0.07	0.12	0.90	-0.02	0.09	0.86	0.98	-0.13	0.09	0.14	0.88
MOTHER-STEPFATHER	-1.07	0.44	0.02	0.34	-1.04	0.44	0.02	0.35	-1.20	0.52	0.02	0.30	-1.45	2.09	0.49	0.24	-1.07	1.53	0.48	0.34
OTHER FAMILIES	-0.09	0.06	0.13	0.92	-0.08	0.06	0.15	0.92	-0.12	0.06	0.06	0.89	-0.12	0.09	0.17	0.88	-0.03	0.09	0.70	0.97
BIRHT COHORT (1907-41 REF.)			0.00				0.00				0.08				0.03				0.64	
1942-51	-0.14	0.04	0.00	0.87	-0.14	0.04	0.00	0.87	-0.49	0.31	0.11	0.61	-0.58	0.35	0.10	0.56	-1.02	1.20	0.40	0.36
1952-61	-0.20	0.04	0.00	0.82	-0.19	0.04	0.00	0.82	-0.64	0.26	0.01	0.53	-0.82	0.28	0.00	0.44	-0.41	0.38	0.28	0.66
1962-66	-0.13	0.04	0.00	0.88	-0.13	0.04	0.00	0.88	-0.42	0.36	0.25	0.66	-0.69	1.67	0.68	0.50	-0.18	0.38	0.64	0.84
MOTHER'S EDUCATION	0.24	0.01	0.00	1.27	0.23	0.01	0.00	1.26	0.22	0.01	0.00	1.25	0.26	0.02	0.00	1.29	0.18	0.02	0.00	1.20
(MISSING M.E.)	0.48	0.19	0.01	1.62	0.44	0.19	0.02	1.55	0.47	0.19	0.01	1.60	1.00	0.24	0.00	2.71	-0.12	0.34	0.74	0.89
FEMALE	0.01	0.00	0.14	1.01	0.01	0.00	0.11	1.01	0.00	0.00	0.89	1.00	****		****		****		****	
MOTHER'S OCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE					0.04	0.01	0.00	1.05	0.05	0.01	0.00	1.05	0.02	0.02	0.19	1.02	0.05	0.02	0.00	1.05
MOTHER'S LABOR ACTIVITY					-0.57	0.11	0.00	0.57	-0.57	0.12	0.00	14.02	-0.33	0.17	0.06	0.72	-0.56	0.17	0.00	0.57
SIBSIZE					0.00	0.01	0.73	1.00	0.00	0.01	0.92	1.00	-0.02	0.02	0.21	0.98	0.02	0.02	0.33	1.02
(MISSING M.O.P.)					1.00	0.23	0.00	2.71	1.03	0.24	0.00	2.81	0.79	0.33	0.02	2.21	0.79	0.32	0.01	2.20
COHORT *MOTHER'S EDUCATION											0.00				0.00				0.00	
*1942-51									0.09	0.03	0.01	1.09	0.07	0.04	0.08	1.08	0.13	0.05	0.01	1.14
*1952-61									0.16	0.03	0.00	1.17	0.13	0.04	0.00	1.14	0.26	0.04	0.00	1.30
*1962-66									-0.03	0.03	0.36	0.97	-0.08	0.05	0.07	0.92	0.12	0.04	0.01	1.13
COHORTE*FEMALE											0.00		*****		*****		*****		*****	
*1942-51									0.03	0.01	0.02	1.03								
*1952-61									0.10	0.01	0.00	1.11								
*1962-66									0.14	0.01	0.00	1.15	****		*****		****		*****	
COHORT*MOTHER'S OCCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE											0.24				0.85				0.50	

*1942-51	-0.05	0.03	0.08	0.95	0.02	0.04	0.56	1.02	-0.05	0.04	0.24	0.95
*1952-61	-0.02	0.03	0.52	0.98	0.03	0.04	0.41	1.03	-0.05	0.04	0.20	0.95
*1962-66	-0.04	0.03	0.14	0.96	0.01	0.04	0.84	1.01	-0.06	0.04	0.15	0.94
COHORT*MOTHER'S LABOR ACTIVITY			0.04				0.48				0.71	
*1942-51	0.63	0.32	0.04	1.89	0.13	0.43	0.76	1.14	0.26	0.47	0.59	1.29
*1952-61	0.08	0.30	0.78	1.09	-0.27	0.39	0.49	0.76	0.32	0.40	0.42	1.38
*1962-66	0.65	0.33	0.05	1.91	0.32	0.48	0.51	1.37	0.53	0.45	0.24	1.69
COHORTE*SIBSIZE			0.00				0.00				0.00	
*1942-51	0.03	0.03	0.27	1.03	0.08	0.04	0.06	1.08	-0.04	0.05	0.43	0.96
*1952-61	-0.09	0.03	0.00	0.91	-0.05	0.04	0.15	0.95	-0.14	0.04	0.00	0.87
*1962-66	-0.09	0.03	0.01	0.91	-0.07	0.05	0.15	0.93	-0.21	0.05	0.00	0.81
COHORT*FAMILY STRUCTURE			0.06				0.43				0.42	
SEPARATION OR DIVORCE*1942-51	0.54	0.51	0.29	1.71	0.27	0.75	0.72	1.31	0.31	0.69	0.65	1.37
SEPARATION OR DIVORCE*1952-61	-0.26	0.16	0.11	0.77	-0.10	0.22	0.65	0.91	-0.01	0.25	0.96	0.99
SEPARATION OR DIVORCE*1962-66	0.14	1.29	0.91	1.15	-0.30	1.32	0.82	0.74	-3.94	5.88	0.50	0.02
WIDOWHOOD*1942-51	-0.07	0.14	0.61	0.93	-0.11	0.19	0.57	0.90	0.42	0.23	0.06	1.52
WIDOWHOOD*1952-61	0.98	0.44	0.03	2.67	0.31	0.54	0.57	1.37	0.36	0.60	0.54	1.44
WIDOWHOOD*1962-66	-0.34	0.15	0.03	0.71	-0.33	0.20	0.09	0.72	-0.21	0.21	0.31	0.81
STEEPFATHER*1942-51	0.29	1.05	0.78	1.33	-0.30	1.06	0.77	0.74	0.25	1.60	0.88	1.28
STEEPFATHER*1952-61	-0.35	0.15	0.02	0.70	-0.39	0.18	0.03	0.68	-0.20	0.20	0.32	0.82
STEEPFATHER*1962-66	0.08	0.47	0.86	1.08	-0.55	0.74	0.45	0.58	-0.01	0.59	0.99	0.99
OTHER FAMILIES*1942-51	-0.37	0.19	0.06	0.69	0.20	0.27	0.47	1.22	-0.18	0.25	0.48	0.83
OTHER FAMILIES*1952-61	-0.78	1.59	0.62	0.46	-2.72	8.23	0.74	0.07	-2.01	1.50	0.18	0.13
OTHER FAMILIES*1962-66	-0.36	0.21	0.09	0.70	-0.54	0.30	0.07	0.58	0.01	0.27	0.97	1.01

## BIRTH

COHORT	FAMILY STRUCTURE	MOTHER EDUCATIONAL LEVEL	MOHTER PATIONAL PRSTG.	OCU- SIBSHIP SIZE
1907-41	BIOLOGICAL MOTHER & FATHER			
	Mean	2.3	82.26	2.93
	N	37677	5280	37867
	Std. Dsv.	1.2	17.92	1.24
	SINGLE-MOTHER HOUSHOLD DUE TO DIVORCE			
	Mean	2.2	79.56	2.10
	N	945	322	954
	Std. Dsv.	1.2	15.56	1.49
	SINGLE-MOTHER HOUSEHOLD DUE TO WIDOWHOOD			
	Mean	2.3	80.91	2.74
	N	5732	1321	5754
	Std. Dsv.	1.2	17.77	1.33
	SINGLE-MOTHER WITH STEPFATHER			
	Mean	2.2	78.42	2.73
	N	248	72	250
	Std. Dsv.	1.0	12.87	1.26
	OTHER FAMILIES			
	Mean	2.3	80.87	2.73
N	6050	826	6318	
Std. Dsv.	1.1	16.51	1.39	
Mean	2.3	81.74	2.87	
N	50652	7821	51143	
Std. Dsv.	1.2	17.63	1.28	
1942-51	BIOLOGICAL MOTHER & FATHER			
	Mean	2.8	87.76	2.56
	N	17363	2462	17494
	Std. Dsv.	1.2	24.78	1.31
	SINGLE-MOTHER HOUSHOLD DUE TO DIVORCE			
	Mean	2.5	81.15	1.46
	N	263	136	264
	Std. Dsv.	1.3	18.19	1.39
	SINGLE-MOTHER HOUSEHOLD DUE TO WIDOWHOOD			
	Mean	2.6	80.13	2.51
	N	1285	359	1289
	Std. Dsv.	1.2	15.07	1.35
	SINGLE-MOTHER WITH STEPFATHER			
	Mean	1.9	88.03	2.60
	N	79	21	79
	Std. Dsv.	1.0	29.44	1.38
	OTHER FAMILIES			
	Mean	2.7	83.49	2.60
N	1844	273	1903	
Std. Dsv.	1.2	18.58	1.39	
Mean	2.8	86.28	2.55	
N	20834	3252	21029	
Std. Dsv.	1.2	23.35	1.32	

BIRTH COHORT	FAMILY STRUCTURE	MOTHER EDUCATIONAL LEVEL	MOTHER EDUCATIONAL PRSTG.	OCU-SIBSHIP SIZE
1952-61	BIOLOGICAL MOTHER & FATHER			
	Mean	3.0	89.08	2.47
	N	21263	2870	21349
	Std. Dsv.	1.3	25.43	1.27
	SINGLE-MOTHER HOUSHOLD DUE TO DIVORCE			
	Mean	2.6	82.16	1.83
	N	252	115	254
	Std. Dsv.	1.3	18.19	1.53
	SINGLE-MOTHER HOUSEHOLD DUE TO WIDOWHOOD			
	Mean	2.8	86.33	2.57
	N	1177	316	1184
	Std. Dsv.	1.3	24.83	1.33
	SINGLE-MOTHER WITH STEPFATHER			
	Mean	2.9	76.75	2.48
	N	68	16	68
Std. Dsv.	1.1	6.97	1.42	
OTHER FAMILIES				
Mean	2.8	86.21	2.55	
N	1587	305	1637	
Std. Dsv.	1.3	22.89	1.38	
Mean	3.0	88.32	2.47	
N	24346	3623	24492	
Std. Dsv.	1.3	24.97	1.29	
1962-66	BIOLOGICAL MOTHER & FATHER			
	Mean	3.2	93.45	2.40
	N	12757	1852	12800
	Std. Dsv.	1.4	27.92	1.22
	SINGLE-MOTHER HOUSHOLD DUE TO DIVORCE			
	Mean	3.1	89.76	2.21
	N	175	65	177
	Std. Dsv.	1.5	28.44	1.37
	SINGLE-MOTHER HOUSEHOLD DUE TO WIDOWHOOD			
	Mean	2.9	88.22	2.49
	N	613	149	614
	Std. Dsv.	1.4	23.15	1.24
	SINGLE-MOTHER WITH STEPFATHER			
	Mean	2.5	93.49	2.55
	N	30	9	31
Std. Dsv.	1.5	20.73	1.31	
OTHER FAMILIES				
Mean	2.9	87.91	2.65	
N	614	110	635	
Std. Dsv.	1.4	22.72	1.32	
Mean	3.2	92.70	2.42	
N	14189	2185	14257	
Std. Dsv.	1.4	27.41	1.23	
Total final				
Mean	2.7	85.45	2.66	
Mínimo	1.0	49.41	.00	
Máximo	8.0	268.71	4.00	
N	110021	16881	110920	
Std. Dsv.	1.3	22.26	1.30	

Table 5 MOTHER LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION BY FAMILY STRUCTURE AND BIRTH COHORT

BIRTH COHORT	FAMILY STRUCTURE					TOTAL
	BIOLOGICAL MOTHER & FATHER	SINGLE-MOTHER HOUSHOLD DUE TO DIVORCE	SINGLE-MOTHER HOUSEHOLD DUE TO WIDOWHOOD	SINGLE-MOTHER WITH STEPFATHER	OTHER FAMILIES	
1907-41 %	14.4%	36.8%	23.7%	27.4%	13.5%	15.8%
N	6739	449	1708	87	1086	10069
1942-51 %	14.0%	48.3%	25.7%	29.0%	14.5%	15.3%
N	2074	113	293	18	237	2735

	1952-61 %	12.9%	45.2%	26.2%	25.4%	17.6%	14.2%
	N	3024	122	346	16	306	3814
	1962-66 %	14.4%	44.0%	24.6%	27.3%	18.4%	15.5%
	N	1808	81	167	9	135	2200
TOTAL	%	14.0%	40.1%	24.3%	27.4%	14.5%	15.4%
	N	13645	765	2514	130	1764	18818

**SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY 1991 (NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS. (INE))**

APENDIX

TABLE 4. CIVIL STATUS BY BIRTH COHORT AND GENDER

		BIRTH COHORT											TOTAL		
		07-16	17-21	22-26	27-31	32-36	37-41	42-46	47-51	52-56	57-61	62-66		67-71	
MARITAL STATUS	SINGLE	%	5,0%	6,1%	6,6%	7,8%	8,4%	7,7%	8,9%	11,0%	13,8%	25,2%	59,3%	93,0%	27,0%
		CASES	144	163	256	358	427	332	441	601	788	1655	4279	6987	16430
	MARRIED	%	73,2%	82,5%	86,2%	87,1%	87,4%	89,1%	88,1%	85,7%	82,6%	70,8%	38,0%	6,2%	68,3%
		CASES	2108	2202	3333	4005	4428	3861	4390	4698	4716	4651	2741	463	41594
	COHABITATION	%	,7%	,4%	,5%	,5%	,5%	,9%	1,1%	1,2%	1,9%	2,3%	1,9%	,6%	1,1%
		CASES	19	11	18	24	28	38	52	66	106	152	135	46	695
	WIDOW	%	20,7%	10,5%	6,0%	3,8%	2,5%	1,1%	,7%	,5%	,2%	,1%	,0%	,0%	2,5%
		CASES	596	280	231	175	127	49	37	29	11	6	2	0	1543
	SEPARATE	%	,4%	,3%	,5%	,7%	,7%	,8%	,8%	1,1%	1,1%	1,2%	,6%	,1%	,7%
		CASES	11	7	18	25	37	33	42	59	60	81	44	8	426
	DIVORCED	%	,0%	,2%	,2%	,3%	,4%	,4%	,4%	,5%	,5%	,3%	,2%	,1%	,3%
		CASES	1	6	8	12	19	19	19	28	29	22	12	7	182
TOTAL	%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	
	CASES		2880	2668	3865	4598	5065	4332	4982	5481	5710	6567	7214	7511	60871

SOURCE: SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY, INE (1991)

TABLE 4. CIVIL STATUS BY BIRTH COHORT AND GENDER

		BIRTH COHORT											TOTAL		
		07-16	17-21	22-26	27-31	32-36	37-41	42-46	47-51	52-56	57-61	62-66		67-71	
MARITAL STATUS	SINGLE	%	11,4%	10,7%	9,3%	8,6%	7,3%	6,3%	7,2%	7,7%	9,8%	15,6%	40,5%	80,6%	20,9%
		CASES	537	390	416	435	383	285	366	427	559	1020	2854	5847	13518
	MARRIED	%	27,1%	49,1%	61,2%	71,9%	77,4%	83,4%	84,4%	85,1%	83,1%	78,1%	55,5%	17,7%	63,7%
		CASES	1276	1790	2729	3654	4085	3801	4271	4684	4719	5106	3911	1282	41307
	COHABITATION	%	,2%	,2%	,3%	,4%	,4%	,6%	,7%	1,4%	1,5%	2,1%	2,1%	1,0%	
		CASES	10	8	15	19	20	26	33	77	87	138	149	86	667
	WIDOW	%	60,8%	39,0%	28,3%	17,7%	13,2%	7,1%	4,9%	1,9%	1,3%	,9%	,2%	,0%	12,3%
		CASES	2864	1420	1261	898	697	323	248	102	74	58	16	3	7963
	SEPARATE	%	,5%	,8%	,7%	1,2%	1,2%	1,9%	1,9%	2,5%	2,7%	2,4%	1,4%	,4%	1,5%
		CASES	24	28	31	60	64	85	97	137	156	159	97	31	969
	DIVORCED	%	,0%	,2%	,1%	,4%	,6%	,9%	,9%	1,4%	1,5%	,9%	,2%	,1%	,6%
		CASES	2	7	5	19	31	39	46	79	84	56	17	5	389
TOTAL	%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	
	CASES		4711	3644	4457	5084	5280	4559	5060	5506	5679	6536	7043	7253	64813

SOURCE: SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY, INE (1991)

FAMILY STRUCTURE AT SIXTEEN AND BIRTH COHORT

		BIRTH COHORT				TOTAL
		1907-41	1942-51	1952-61	1962-66	
BIOLOGICAL MOTHER & FATHER	%	74.0%	83.2%	87.2%	89.8%	80.7%
	N	37867	17494	21349	12800	89511
SINGLE-MOTHER -DIVORCE/SEPARATION	%	1.9%	1.3%	1.0%	1.2%	1.5%
	N	954	264	254	177	1649
SINGLE-MOTHER -WIDOWHOOD	%	11.3%	6.1%	4.8%	4.3%	8.0%
	N	5754	1289	1184	614	8841
SINGLE-MOTHER -STEPFATHER	%	.5%	.4%	.3%	.2%	.4%
	N	250	79	68	31	427
OTHER FAMILIES	%	12.4%	9.1%	6.7%	4.5%	9.5%
	N	6318	1903	1637	635	10492
TOTAL	%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	N	51143	21029	24492	14257	110920

SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY 1991 (NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS. (INE))

BIRTH COHORT	FAMILY STRUCTURE	MOTHER EDUCATIONAL LEVEL	MOTHER OCCUPATIONAL PRSTG.	SIBSHIP SIZE
1907-41	BIOLOGICAL MOTHER & FATHER			
	Mean	2.3	82.26	2.93
	N	37677	5280	37867
	Std. Dsv.	1.2	17.92	1.24
	SINGLE-MOTHER HOUSHOLD DUE TO DIVORCE			
	Mean	2.2	79.56	2.10
	N	945	322	954
	Std. Dsv.	1.2	15.56	1.49
	SINGLE-MOTHER HOUSEHOLD DUE TO WIDOWHOOD			
	Mean	2.3	80.91	2.74
	N	5732	1321	5754
	Std. Dsv.	1.2	17.77	1.33
	SINGLE-MOTHER WITH STEPFATHER			
	Mean	2.2	78.42	2.73
	N	248	72	250
Std. Dsv.	1.0	12.87	1.26	
OTHER FAMILIES				
Mean	2.3	80.87	2.73	
N	6050	826	6318	
Std. Dsv.	1.1	16.51	1.39	
Mean	2.3	81.74	2.87	
N	50652	7821	51143	
Std. Dsv.	1.2	17.63	1.28	
1942-51	BIOLOGICAL MOTHER & FATHER			
	Mean	2.8	87.76	2.56
	N	17363	2462	17494
	Std. Dsv.	1.2	24.78	1.31
	SINGLE-MOTHER HOUSHOLD DUE TO DIVORCE			
	Mean	2.5	81.15	1.46
	N	263	136	264
	Std. Dsv.	1.3	18.19	1.39
	SINGLE-MOTHER HOUSEHOLD DUE TO WIDOWHOOD			
	Mean	2.6	80.13	2.51
	N	1285	359	1289
	Std. Dsv.	1.2	15.07	1.35
	SINGLE-MOTHER WITH STEPFATHER			
	Mean	1.9	88.03	2.60
	N	79	21	79
Std. Dsv.	1.0	29.44	1.38	
OTHER FAMILIES				
Mean	2.7	83.49	2.60	
N	1844	273	1903	
Std. Dsv.	1.2	18.58	1.39	
Mean	2.8	86.28	2.55	
N	20834	3252	21029	
Std. Dsv.	1.2	23.35	1.32	

BIRTH COHORT	FAMILY STRUCTURE	MOTHER EDUCATIONAL LEVEL	MOTHER EDUCATIONAL PRSTG.	OCU-SIBSHIP SIZE
1952-61	BIOLOGICAL MOTHER & FATHER			
	Mean	3.0	89.08	2.47
	N	21263	2870	21349
	Std. Dsv.	1.3	25.43	1.27
	SINGLE-MOTHER HOUSHOLD DUE TO DIVORCE			
	Mean	2.6	82.16	1.83
	N	252	115	254
	Std. Dsv.	1.3	18.19	1.53
	SINGLE-MOTHER HOUSEHOLD DUE TO WIDOWHOOD			
	Mean	2.8	86.33	2.57
	N	1177	316	1184
	Std. Dsv.	1.3	24.83	1.33
	SINGLE-MOTHER WITH STEPFATHER			
	Mean	2.9	76.75	2.48
	N	68	16	68
Std. Dsv.	1.1	6.97	1.42	
OTHER FAMILIES				
Mean	2.8	86.21	2.55	
N	1587	305	1637	
Std. Dsv.	1.3	22.89	1.38	
Mean	3.0	88.32	2.47	
N	24346	3623	24492	
Std. Dsv.	1.3	24.97	1.29	
1962-66	BIOLOGICAL MOTHER & FATHER			
	Mean	3.2	93.45	2.40
	N	12757	1852	12800
	Std. Dsv.	1.4	27.92	1.22
	SINGLE-MOTHER HOUSHOLD DUE TO DIVORCE			
	Mean	3.1	89.76	2.21
	N	175	65	177
	Std. Dsv.	1.5	28.44	1.37
	SINGLE-MOTHER HOUSEHOLD DUE TO WIDOWHOOD			
	Mean	2.9	88.22	2.49
	N	613	149	614
	Std. Dsv.	1.4	23.15	1.24
	SINGLE-MOTHER WITH STEPFATHER			
	Mean	2.5	93.49	2.55
	N	30	9	31
Std. Dsv.	1.5	20.73	1.31	
OTHER FAMILIES				
Mean	2.9	87.91	2.65	
N	614	110	635	
Std. Dsv.	1.4	22.72	1.32	
Mean	3.2	92.70	2.42	
N	14189	2185	14257	
Std. Dsv.	1.4	27.41	1.23	
Total final				
Mean	2.7	85.45	2.66	
Mínimo	1.0	49.41	.00	
Máximo	8.0	268.71	4.00	
N	110021	16881	110920	
Std. Dsv.	1.3	22.26	1.30	